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On the Tension between Sex Equality and Religious Freedom 
 
Cass R. Sunstein*  
 
Abstract 
 
When, if ever, is it legitimate for law to ban sex discrimination by religious institutions? 
It is best to approach this question by noticing that most of the time, ordinary civil and criminal 
law are legitimately applied to such institutions. For example, members of religious 
organizations cannot commit torts, even if the commission of torts is said to be part of their 
religious practices. Many people seem to accept what might be called an Asymmetry Thesis, 
which holds that sex equality principles may not be applied to religious institutions, whereas 
ordinary civil and criminal law may indeed be applied to them. This essay argues that the 
Asymmetry Thesis cannot be defended, and that much of the time, sex equality principles are 
properly applied to religious institutions. Discussion is also devoted to the controversial idea that 
facially neutral laws may be applied to religious institutions even if they have a severe adverse 
effect on religious practices.  
 
 
My topic here is an insufficiently explored puzzle. In the United States and in 
many other nations, it is generally agreed that most ordinary law, both civil and criminal, 
is legitimately applied to religious organizations. Thus, for example, a secular 
government may prohibit members of a religious institution from engaging in murder, 
kidnapping, assault, cruelty to animals, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
even if those acts are part of religious ceremony or otherwise guided or even mandated 
by religious precepts.  
At the same time, it is generally agreed that there are important limits on the 
extent to which the law of sex discrimination is legitimately applied to religious 
organizations. Often those limits are respected voluntarily by governments. States do not, 
for example, require the Catholic Church to ordain women as priests, and under existing 
law, religious institutions are plainly permitted to engage in acts that would be 
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University of Chicago. This essay is forthcoming in a book edited by Robert Reich and Debra Satz on the 
work of Susan Moller Okin, and I am grateful to Reich and Satz for their valuable comments. Special 
thanks to Okin herself, in memoriam; her important work on multiculturalism and its limits inspired the 
discussion here. 2 
unacceptable discrimination if carried out by a secular entity.1 Interference with religious 
autonomy is pervasive under the ordinary criminal and civil law. But such interference is 
usually absent if sex discrimination is the problem that the government is seeking to 
address. Indeed, such interference is sometimes thought to be unconstitutional or to be 
inconsistent with the most fundamental ideals—to violate the defining commitment to 
respect for religious institutions. 
  An important commonplace of democratic theory and practice might therefore be 
deemed the Asymmetry Thesis. According to the Asymmetry Thesis, it is unproblematic 
to apply ordinary civil and criminal law to religious institutions, but problematic to apply 
the law forbidding sex discrimination to those institutions. Thus it is uncontroversially 
acceptable to prevent priests from beating up women (or anyone else) as part of a 
religious ceremony, or to ban Orthodox Jews from assaulting Reform women rabbis 
(even if they are sincerely motivated by a religiously-founded idea of a male rabbinate); 
but it is often thought unacceptable to ban sex segregation in religious education,2 or to 
prohibit religious groups from excluding women from certain domains. 
  What is the source of this asymmetry? Can it be defended? I believe that in the 
end, there is no good defense of the Asymmetry Thesis, and that in many contexts, 
neither liberal ideals nor the Constitution should be taken to forbid government from 
banning sex discrimination by religious institutions. To sustain this argument, it will be 
necessary to say something about the nature of liberal ideals. 
 
I. Puzzles and Conflicts 
 
  To anchor the discussion, consider some potential conflicts between sex equality 
and freedom of religion, conflicts that arise in one or another form in many nations: 
  1. Certain Jewish synagogues educate boys separately from girls, and certain 
Jewish schools refuse to admit girls. Some Jewish girls and their parents contend that this 
                                                 
1 American law makes the basic prohibitions on employment discrimination inapplicable where religion, 
sex, or national origin is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e). The prohibition is generally 
inapplicable “to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the 
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” 42 USC 2000e-1. 
2 Of course the American Constitution applies only to the state, and not to private institutions; hence the 
Asymmetry Thesis has its force when government goes beyond the Constitution to apply a prohibition on 
sex discrimination to most private institutions but not to religion. 3 
is a form of sex discrimination that contributes to sex-role stereotyping, in a way that 
produces damaging effects on boys and especially girls, and that may even compromise 
fair equality of opportunity.  
  2. A Catholic university refuses to tenure several women teachers in its canon law 
department. A disappointed faculty member complains that this is a form of employment 
discrimination.3 The university responds that courts should not be allowed intervene in a 
religious matter of this kind. 
  3. A young man trains and studies for ordination to the priesthood of the Society 
of Jesus. He is repeatedly subjected to sexual harassment by two ordained priests. The 
harassment takes the form of unwanted sexual comments, propositions, and pornographic 
mailings. He brings suit for employment discrimination.4 It is objected that the suit 
compromises religious liberty. 
  4. Mormon employers engage in various practices of sex discrimination in 
employment. They refuse to hire women for certain jobs; they claim that being male is an 
occupational qualification, imposed in good faith, for certain positions. These practices 
are undertaken in the private sector, in institutions that both have and do not have 
explicitly religious functions. 
  5. A Western nation allows immigrant men to bring in multiple wives. It 
recognizes their polygamous marriages and various discriminatory practices (including 
“assigning” teenage girls to older men for marriage) that accompany certain religious 
convictions. 
  Freedom of religion has a central place in the liberal tradition, and in the United 
States, as elsewhere, the law forbidding sex discrimination contains important 
exemptions for religious institutions. Federal law itself permits “bona fide occupational 
qualifications” based on sex, and usually the exemptions are voluntary. But courts have 
said that the free exercise clause of the Constitution requires courts to refrain from 
adjudicating sex discrimination suits by ministers against the church or religious 
institution employing them—even though ministers could certainly complain of assault 
                                                 
3 See EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 856 F. Supp. 1 (DDC 1994), affirmed, 83 F.2d 455 (DC 
Cir. 1994). 
4 Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7563 (May 15, 1998). 4 
or rape.5 In the religious context, this principle of religious immunity from secular law 
has been read quite broadly, to apply to lay employees of institutions (including high 
schools and universities) whose primary duties consist of spreading the faith or 
supervising religious rituals.6  
  As I have suggested, the resulting doctrine is a puzzle in light of the fact that 
almost no one believes that in general, religious organizations can be exempted from 
most of the law forbidding civil and criminal wrongs. The puzzle is not only obvious but 
also important, for there is good reason to believe that some of the most pernicious forms 
of sex discrimination are a result of the practices of religious institutions, which can 
produce internalized norms of subordination.7 Those internalized norms might undermine 
equality of opportunity itself, as when women scale back their aspirations to conform to 
those internalized norms. People’s preferences, especially in the domain of sex equality, 
should not be taken as given, or as coming from the sky; discriminatory beliefs and role-
based choices are often produced by a discriminatory society. Religious practices often 
contribute a great deal to such beliefs and choices, on the part of men and women alike. 
In such circumstances it is not even clear whether the relevant preferences are 
authentically “theirs.” The remedy of “exit”—the right of women to leave a religious 
group or order—is crucial, but in practice it may not be available. Indeed, “exit” will not 
be sufficient when girls have been taught in such a way as to be unable or unwilling to 
scrutinize the practices with which they have grown up. Here in particular, the ideal of 
equal opportunity is compromised. 
  There is a further problem. Seemingly isolated decisions of individual women 
may help establish and reproduce norms of inequality that are injurious to other women. 
Women interested in sex equality therefore face a collective action problem; rational acts 
by individual women can help sustain discriminatory norms. To say the least, it is not 
obvious how a liberal society should respond to this problem. But some measures 
prohibiting sex discrimination may make things better. 
 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 
1994) 
6 EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1994). 
7 To say this is not to deny that norms of sex equality are often an outgrowth of religious beliefs as well, 
nor is it to offer a general view about whether the world’s religions promote or deny sex equality; it is 
doubtful that any general view would make much sense. 5 
II. The Smith Principle: Generality and Administrability 
 
  To answer the underlying question, and to understand the asymmetry principle, it 
is necessary to step back a bit and say a offer some more general words about the 
relationship between constitutional law and religious institutions. In the United States, 
there is a sharp and continuing debate about whether a state may apply “facially neutral” 
laws to religious institutions.8 A law is facially neutral if it does not specifically aim at 
religious practices or belief; thus a law banning the payment of taxes, the burning of 
animals, or the use of peyote is facially neutral, whereas a law banning the Lord’s Prayer, 
or the practice of Buddhism, is facially discriminatory.  
  Under current law in the United States, any facially neutral law is presumed to be 
constitutionally acceptable.9 The validity of all facially neutral laws may be deemed “the 
Smith principle,” after the highly controversial Supreme Court decision that established 
it. Congress attempted to “overrule” Smith with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
which would have required the state to provide a strong secular justification for any law 
that burdened religion, even if the law was neutral on its face; but the Court struck down 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond legislative power.10  
 The  Smith principle seems to be undergirded by two distinct ideas. The first 
involves an understanding of the relationship between liberty and the political safeguards 
that are expected to accompany democratic processes: A secular law that is neutral on its 
face is highly unlikely to interfere with religious liberty, properly conceived. The reason 
is that the democratic process is a sufficient safeguard against laws that are facially 
neutral but oppressive. The very neutrality (and hence generality) of such laws 
guarantees against oppressiveness, for when a number of groups are subject to law, they 
are likely to mobilize against them and to prevent their enactment (unless there are very 
                                                 
8 Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109 (1990); 
Abner Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale LJ 1611 (1993). 
9 Employment Division, Department of Human Services v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Technically, Smith 
holds that a facially neutral law will be upheld so long as it has a “rational basis,” unless it is 
discriminatorily motivated. The Court did not overrule Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding 
that a state may not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired because she 
would not work on Saturday) or Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish teenagers to be 
exempted from a requirement of school attendance until the age of 16); but it did read those cases 
extremely narrowly. It should be noted that the Smith decision was surprising as well as controversial and 
that it remains an object of continuing debate, not only in political and academic circles but also within the 
Supreme Court itself. 
10 City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S Ct 2157 (1997). 6 
good reasons for them). But if a law is narrowly tailored so as to discriminate against a 
particular group—no public religious services for Catholics or Buddhists, for example—
the ordinary political safeguards are not in play. By emphasizing the value of such 
safeguards, and their relevance to constitutional law, Smith is connected with 
longstanding liberal themes, suggesting that a requirement of generality provides a 
political check on unjustified interferences with freedom. 
  The second basis for the Smith principle is one of judicial administrability: Even 
if some facially neutral laws raise serious questions in principle, it is very hard to 
administer a test for constitutionality (or political legitimacy) that would require a kind of 
balancing of the opposing interests. Suppose, for example, that courts ruled that burdens 
on religious liberty are justified if and only if the secular reason for the burdens 
outweighs the intrusion on religion. We can imagine some easy cases here. A neutral tax 
law, for example, would almost certainly be upheld against the objection that it intrudes 
on the religious convictions of some, because a tax system would be very hard to run if 
religious objectors could exempt themselves. But many cases would be exceedingly hard 
for courts to handle, simply because of the difficulty of balancing the claims on both 
sides. The best defense of the Smith principle is that even if it protects religious liberty 
too little, it comes close to protecting religious liberty enough—and it does so with the 
only principle that real-world institutions can apply fairly and easily.  
Under the Smith principle, facially neutral laws are legitimate, even if they 
interfere with religious liberty. A straightforward reading of the principle would suggest 
that no less than other neutral measures, laws forbidding discrimination can property be 
applied to religious institutions. Hence the Asymmetry Thesis is not at all compelled by 
the Smith principle. On the contrary, the Asymmetry Thesis is in grave tension with the 
Smith principle, which would seem to permit application of antidiscrimination laws, 
facially neutral as they are. The strongest challenge to the principle is that many facially 
neutral laws do impose substantial burdens on religion; that they lack sufficient liberal 
justification; and that institutions, including judicial institutions, should not be deemed 
incapable of drawing the appropriate lines.  
 
III. Legal Possibilities 
 7 
  With this background, let us now turn to the reasons why a state might be 
permitted to apply the ordinary civil and criminal law to religious institutions, but be 
proscribed from applying the law of sex discrimination to such institutions. Let us see, in 
short, how the Asymmetry Thesis might be defended. As we have seen, asymmetry is a 
common practice in many nations, whether or not it is constitutionally compelled: Even if 
governments are not required to exempt religious institutions from sex discrimination 
law, they often elect to do so. 
 1.  Ordinary law is backed by a compelling interest, as sex discrimination law is 
not. The first possibility is that in principle, a state should interfere with religious 
practices only when it has an especially strong reason for doing so (sometimes described 
as a “compelling interest”). The ordinary criminal and civil law provides that reason; the 
law that forbids sex discrimination does not. On this view, it is one thing for a state to 
prohibit murder or assault. It is quite another thing for a state to forbid discriminatory 
practices.  
  There can be no doubt that an intuition of this kind helps explain current practice; 
indeed, I believe that it plays a large role in establishing the conventional wisdom and the 
Asymmetry Thesis itself. And the idea would have some force if the ordinary criminal 
and civil law always directed itself against extremely serious harms. But it does not. The 
ordinary law prohibits torts that are often relatively modest (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, low-level libels, minor assaults that count as such even without 
physical contact). The state does not apply the tort law to religious organizations only 
when the underlying torts impose grave injuries. Under the Smith principle, there is no 
weighing of the state’s interest to assess its magnitude. (Even before that case, there was 
little doubt that ordinary tort law could be applied to religious groups.) For example, the 
law against the intentional infliction of emotional distress is entirely applicable to 
religious institutions. Like everyone else, priests and rabbis are not permitted to tell 
people, falsely, that their children have just been run over by trucks, even if those people 
are religious enemies. 
  Religious organizations are thus subject to civil and criminal law prohibiting low-
level harms. Why can’t the law against sex discrimination be applied as well? At first 
glance, the interests behind that law are important rather than trivial. It is not easy to 
explain why that the interest in being free from sex discrimination is, in principle, weaker 8 
than the interests that underlie various aspects of the ordinary civil and criminal law. 
Often the interest in eliminating sex discrimination appears to be far stronger than the 
particular interest involved in ordinary law. We have seen that under Smith, governments 
should be permitted, at least, to apply the law of sex discrimination to religious 
organizations. The Asymmetry Principle would seem to have no authority if Smith is 
right. But governments frequently exempt religious institutions from laws forbidding sex 
discrimination, even though they apply most of their ordinary civil and criminal law. 
  Now perhaps it will be responded that the Smith principle is wrong and that in 
order for the state to respect liberty, the law should not apply to religious institutions 
unless the state has an especially strong reason for the application. This idea lay behind 
the 1996 Religious Freedom Restoration Act. As we have seen, that Act was invalidated 
by the Supreme Court in 1997 as beyond Congress’ power; but it did, and does, 
exemplify a widely shared view about the nature of religious liberty. On that view, a 
degree of “balancing” is necessary; the degree of the state’s intrusion into religion must 
be measured against the strength of the state’s reason for the intrusion.  
For present purposes what is important is that even if we reject the Smith 
principle, we need not approve of the asymmetry between the law banning sex 
discrimination and ordinary law. There is no reason to accept the view that ordinary law 
is backed by a strong or compelling interest, while the law of sex discrimination is not so 
backed.  
2.  Ordinary law does not strike at the heart of religious liberty, as sex 
discrimination law often would. It might be thought that a prohibition on sex 
discrimination would impose a substantial burden on religious beliefs and practices, or 
even strike at their heart, whereas the ordinary civil and criminal law does not. On this 
view, the Smith principle is wrong; some exemptions from ordinary law are necessary 
from the standpoint of religious liberty.11 But the reason for any religious exemptions is 
respect for religious autonomy—respect that can usually coexist with ordinary civil and 
criminal law, but not with the law forbidding sex discrimination. For some religious 
institutions, a secular mandate of a (controversial conception of) sex equality would be 
                                                 
11 In EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1994), the court held, without much 
explanation, that Smith did not undermine previous holdings that there was an exception for ministers from 
the general sex discrimination law. 9 
intolerable, whereas application for ordinary law fits comfortably, in general, with their 
own beliefs and practices. The Asymmetry Thesis might be squarely defended on this 
ground. 
  The argument is not entirely without force. Sometimes ordinary civil or criminal 
law is entirely consistent with the norms of religious institutions; indeed, such law often 
grows directly or indirectly out of religious norms. The prohibition against murder is a 
foundation of both religious and secular law; much of standard law can claim religious 
roots. It is for this reason that application of ordinary civil and criminal law causes no 
trouble for most religious organizations. The use of the law’s prohibitions is compatible 
with, even in the service of, the goals of those organizations. And it is also possible to 
imagine requirements of sex equality that would go against the heart of certain religious 
convictions; imagine a ban on sex discrimination in the priesthood. Perhaps the 
Asymmetry Thesis can be defended on the view that ordinary civil and criminal law does 
not compromise religious practices, whereas a ban on sex equality would do exactly that. 
But in its broadest form, this argument is quite fragile. Some aspects of ordinary 
civil and criminal law do strike against practices and beliefs that are central to some 
religions. Consider, for example, the law forbidding animal sacrifice or the use of drugs, 
or even laws forbidding certain kinds of assault and imprisonment. And some aspects of 
the law of sex discrimination interfere not at all with some religious beliefs and practices. 
For some religions, some of the time, sex equality is permissible or even mandatory; in 
any case it is practiced. 
  Now it is conceivable that as a class, ordinary civil laws coexist easily with most 
religious practices and beliefs, whereas the law of sex discrimination does not. But to the 
extent that this is so, it is a contingent, time-bound, highly empirical fact, one that bears 
little on the question of basic principle or the resolution of particular cases. If, for 
example, it were thought that the state could interfere with religious practices only when 
the interference was not serious, we could not justify a sharp asymmetry between 
ordinary law and the law of sex discrimination. We would have to proceed in a more 
fine-grained way; we would not endorse the Asymmetry Thesis. We would have to ask 
more particular questions about the relationship between the practice at issue and the 
legal intervention. In the end, the Asymmetry Thesis cannot be plausibly defended on the 10 
ground that ordinary law is a smaller intrusion into religious autonomy than is sex 
equality law. 
 3.  Balancing in support of asymmetry. It would be possible to defend the 
Asymmetry Thesis by rejecting the Smith principle and with the suggestion that an 
appropriate test depends on both the strength and nature of the state’s interest and on the 
extent of the adverse effect on religion. Under this approach, we might reach the 
following simple conclusions: 
  A weak state interest (in preventing, let us suppose, not very harmful libels) is 
insufficient to justify any intrusion on religion at all;  
  an illegitimate interest (in, say, weakening a religion hostile to the political status 
quo) is entirely off-limits;  
  an “overriding” interest (in, for example, preventing murder) would justify any 
intrusion no matter how severe; 
   a strong or “compelling” interest would justify most intrusions on religion, at 
least if the intrusion were not very severe.  
Under this approach, most cases would therefore be easy. The hardest problems 
would arise where a strong or “compelling” interest were matched by a plausible claim 
that the interference would seriously jeopardize the continuing functioning of the relevant 
religion.  
  In principle, a standard of this sort seems a sensible one for a democratic social 
order to adopt. The major problem is that to accept it, we would have to have a high 
degree of confidence in those who would be entrusted with its administration. Such a 
standard would require courts (or other institutions) to decide which aspects of the civil 
and criminal law were sufficiently justified. Thus we could imagine reasonable 
judgments in favor of application, to religious institutions, of a legal ban on killing and 
torturing animals, but against application of a legal ban on peyote, on the ground that the 
former created a risk to third parties. The legitimacy of applying principles against sex 
discrimination to religious institutions would depend on an assessment of two factors: (1) 
the strength of the interest in those principles and (2) the extent of the interference with 
religious institutions.  11 
  In responding to an earlier version of this essay, Susan Moller Okin raised two 
objections.12 First, she contended that an approach of this kind would give religious 
institutions an unfortunate incentive, which is to claim that sex discrimination is central 
to their own practices. Second, she objected that the approach would require courts to ask 
difficult interpretive questions about the extent to which a nondiscrimination requirement 
would be burdensome or harmful to religious institutions. Objections of this kind might 
seem to cast Smith in a more favorable light, in a way that might simply permit states to 
apply sex discrimination law to religious institutions. Or such objections might be used in 
defense of the Asymmetry Thesis, to suggest that courts ought simply to allow religious 
institutions to discriminate on the basis of sex whenever they contend, plausibly, that 
such discrimination is central to their own practices. But the question is whether the 
considerations that Okin marshals are decisive; and I do not believe that they are.  
Whenever an apparently neutral practice is brought to bear against a religious 
institution, and the institution objects, there is an incentive to claim that the practice in 
question is central to the religion; and that incentive cannot by itself mean either that 
apparently neutral laws are always unacceptable or always legitimate. Okin’s second 
claim is more powerful. To say the least, courts are unlikely to be in the best position to 
know whether sex discrimination is central to a religion. But under any regime that calls 
for a degree of balancing, courts will have to ask some questions that they are not ideally 
suited to answer. In some cases, the claim of centrality will clearly be unconvincing, 
simply because it will not fit with the usual practices of the religion. In other cases, it will 
have evident force. The hardest cases will have to be solved with presumptions and 
burdens of proof, in a way that is hardly unfamiliar to courts dealing with difficult 
constitutional problems. 
Some of the trickiest issues will be evidentiary. When judges are asking the 
relevant questions, ought they to look at poll-type responses from believers? Ought they 
to make their own judgments about doctrinal centrality? What criteria are they looking 
for? Doctrinal centrality, by their own lights? Poll-type responses of believers? Expertise 
of scholars? At first glance, the judgments of genuine experts would be most reliable in 
this context as elsewhere. Assessments by members of the relevant religion would be 
most informative but also self-serving. We could imagine a set of possible responses. 
                                                 
12 See Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? (1999). 12 
Perhaps those who seek to apply the law should have to demonstrate that it will not, in 
fact, operate against the core of a religion’s beliefs. Perhaps those who seek to evade the 
law ought to be required to show that it would, in fact, do so. Presumptions would be 
unavoidable in the event of reasonable contestation.  
I am not sure how Okin herself would have resolved this problem. She did believe 
that tax-exempt status should not be extended to the Catholic Church so long as it 
discriminates against women in hiring and institutional structure. But her own position 
was sensitive to the interests of oppressed religious groups, in a way that would further 
complicate the analysis. Apparently Okin would treat oppressed groups more favorably 
than those that have not been oppressed. I wonder about this distinction. In my view, the 
fact that a religious group has itself been subject to discrimination, or oppression, is an 
inadequate reason to permit it to treat women as less than equal, or to deny them fair 
equality of opportunity.  
  Doubtless different outcomes would be imaginable in different contexts, and I do 
not mean to sort out all of the conceivable dilemmas. My basic point is that with a 
balancing approach of this kind, the asymmetry between most civil and criminal law and 
the law banning sex discrimination could not possibly be sustained. Under the standard I 
am proposing, some ordinary law would not legitimately be applied to religious 
institutions, and some of the law banning sex discrimination could be so applied. The 
legal standard would force a candid assessment of the nature of the intrusion and the 
strength of the underlying interest—and not rest content with homilies (by no means 
followed with most civil and criminal law) about the legitimate autonomy of religious 
institutions.  13 
IV. Conclusions 
 
  I offer three simple conclusions: 
 
  1. There is a plausible rationale for the principle, accepted by the United States 
Supreme Court, that a democratic social order should accept all laws that do not 
discriminate “on their face” against religious institutions and practices. This principle 
would require rejection of the Asymmetry Thesis, because it would authorize the 
application to those institutions of most civil and criminal law and also of laws 
forbidding sex discrimination. Though plausible, this principle is not in the end 
acceptable, because it would allow the state to subject religious institutions to laws that 
substantially burden those institutions, or even strike at their heart, without at the same 
time serving a sufficiently important governmental purpose. 
  2. It is not only plausible but also correct to say that a liberal social order should 
disallow facially neutral laws if they (a) interfere in a significant way with religious 
practices, or impose a substantial burden on religious institutions, and (b) are not 
supported by a legitimate and sufficiently strong justification. But this idea does not 
support the Asymmetry Thesis, or anything like a categorical distinction between 
ordinary civil and criminal law and laws forbidding sex discrimination. In many cases, 
the idea would allow religious institutions to immunize themselves from ordinary law, 
but forbid them from immunizing themselves from the law prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sex. 
  3. There is no plausible rationale for the view, embodied in the Asymmetry Thesis 
and the practices of many democratic nations, that it is unproblematic to apply ordinary 
civil and criminal law to religious institutions, but that it is problematic to apply, to those 
institutions, laws forbidding sex discrimination.  
  This conclusion means that there is no general barrier to applying such laws to 
religious institutions. Whether it is legitimate to do so depends on the extent of the 
interference with religious convictions and the strength of the state’s justification. 
Reasonable people can reach different conclusions about particular cases. An especially 
serious problem, with implications for the resolution of hard cases, is the effects of 
discriminatory practices on the development of beliefs and aspirations on the part of men 
and women alike. It would follow that in at least some of the cases traced in part I above, 14 
the religious practice would have to yield. In the long-run, acceptance of this conclusion, 
and rejection of the Asymmetry Thesis, would be likely to have significant and salutary 
consequences for democratic theory and practice. 
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